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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant* William Harold Kendrick, appeals 
from a conviction of the crime of robbery entered against 
him in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of robbery by a jury 
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and was sentenced to serve in the Utah State Prison for 
the indeterminate term of 1-15 years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of 
Facts with the following additions and corrections: 
1. The evidence offered by the State proved that: 
(a) appellant and Mr. Travis entered the lounge to-
gether and pushed Mr. Zancanella and Mr. Roberts down 
on the floor (Tr. 32, 33, 80); (b) appellant and Mr. 
Travis forcibly took the victims' wallets, money, and 
other personal belongings, and then took money belong-
ing to the business located in a money bag and cash 
register behind the bar counter (Tr. 33-36, 55-58); (c) 
Mr. Roberts was beaten and lost consciousness when be 
was hit over the bead (Tr. 36, 55-56); (d) two persons 
left the lounge together carrying a money bag (Tr. 81); 
(e) Mr. Zancanella told the police he had been robbed 
(Tr. 84, 112); (f) appellant, Mr. Travis, and Miss Ruwe 
were later apprehended with various rolls of coins, sacks, 
and personal items belonging to Mr. Zancanella, Mr. 
Roberts, and the lounge (Tr. 108, 109); (g) at the place 
of apprehension, Mr. Zancanella identified appellant and 
Mr. Travis as the men who had robbed him (Tr. 126). 
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2. Mr. Zancanella denied ever putting his hand on 
Mr. Travis or making a pass at appellant or making a 
homosexual pass at the bartender (Tr. 41, 42, 48). 
3. Mr. Roberts denied ever raising his fists or yell-
ing at appellant (Tr. 75). 
4. Mr. LaVoie, a bystander across the street from 
the scene of the crime, testified that two people got out 
of a blue 1962 Impala with green license plates and white 
lettering, went into the lounge, exited carrying a money 
bag, and drove quickly away (Tr. 79-83). 
5. Appellant, M^. Travis, and Miss Ruwe had used 
and were apprehended in a v^hcile fitting the above de-
scription (Tr. 92, 114, 116). 
6. The refusal of Mr. Tnavis to testify was not 
anticipated by the prosecution (Tr. 187, 188). 
7. The four leading questions asked by the prose-
cution to Mr. Travis at the time Mr. Travis refused to 
testify did not incorporate the testimony given by Mr. 
Travis at his previous trial. Rather, the only questions 
that the prosecution asked involved whether Mr. Travis 
had previously met or traveled with the appellant and 
certainly did not incorporate the testimony within the 
fifty-six pages of transcript (Tr. 186). 
NOTE: Page numbers refer to typed numbers of 
the transcript as determined by the reporter in the trial 
count below, in accordance with appellant's brief,, and 
not according to transcript page numbecrs which include 
the documents' portion of the transcript on appeal. 
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE 
APPELLANT'S SIXTH A M E N D M E N T 
RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES 
AGAINST HIM BY RECEIVING INTO EVI-
DENCE A CODEFENDANT'S PRIOR TES-
TIMONY. 
Appellant was convicted of robbery under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, which provides: 
"(1) Robbery is the unlawful and inten-
tional taking of personal property in the posses-
sion of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, accomplished by 
means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second de-
gree," 
The fact that the basic elements of the crime of 
robbery were committed is not disputed by appellant. 
Appellant's contenition is that the trial court violated 
appellant's Sixth Amendment rights to confront the wit-
nesses against him when the court allowed a codefen-
dant's prior testimony to be received into evidence, which 
was given at the codefendant's own separate trial and 
which implicated the appellant. Respondent contends 
that (1) the admission of the prior testimony does not 
raise a constitutional issue with respect to appellant's 
Sixth Amendment rights; (2) any constitutional objec-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion that is raised falls within the exceptions outlined 
by the United States Supreme Court; and (3) even if 
appellant's right to confront the witnesses against him 
was violated, the error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
A. The admission of the prior testimony in the 
present case did not violate appellant's constitutional 
rights, but rather was designed to attack the credibility 
of the oodefendaixt. The prosecution was aware that the 
codefendant had implicated the appellant in the robbery 
during the codefendant's earlier severed testimony. In 
order to present this additional implicating evidence be-
fore the jury, the codefendant was called by the prose-
cution to testify against the appellant (Tr. 183). The 
codefendant's refusal to tesitify was not anticipated by 
the prosecution (Tr. 187, 188). Because the codefendant 
refused to testify, the trial court held the codefendant 
in comtempt of court on the grounds that the codefen-
dant was not an accused in the oasq, he waived his Fifth 
Amendment rights at the time of his trial and based on 
his testimony at that time, he claimed innocence of this 
particular robbery, and if he testified the same way, it 
would not incriminate him (Tr. 185, 187). The trial court 
had the authority to require the codefendant to testify 
under Rule 25(a), U. R. E. (1971), which requires a wit-
ness to testify and not invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination if the judge finds that the matter will 
not incriminate the witness. Nevertheless, the prosecu-
tion was faced with two difficult alternatives. The prose-
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cution could either allow the jury to infer from the code-
fendant's refusal to testify that the codefendant had 
committed the crime, and not the appellant, or the prose-
cution could impeach the codefendant as a hostile wit-
ness by introducing his prior inconsistent testimony. The 
prosecution of course chose to impeach the codefendant 
under Rule 20, U. R. E. (1971), which allowed any party, 
including the party calling the witness,, to introduce any 
statement or conduct relevant upon the issues of credi-
bility, and under Rule 63(1), U. R. E. (1971), which 
provides: 
"A prior statement of a witness, if the judge 
finds that the witness had an adequate oppor-
tunity to perceive the event or condition which 
his statement narrates, describes, or explains, 
provided that (a) it is inconsistent with his pres-
ent testimony, or (b) it contains otherwise ad-
missible facts which the witness denies having 
stated or has forgotten since making the state-
ment, or (c) it will support testimony made by 
the witness in the present case when such tes-
timony has been challenged." 
Rule 63(1) "also makes such statement, when admitted, 
substantive evidence in the case." Under the Rules of 
Evidence, therefore^ the prior testimony of the codefen-
dant was admissible for impeachment purposes and could 
be considered as substantive evidence. 
Appellant's argument, that such evidence should not 
be admissible, is also invalid because of its sheer im-
practicality. If the court were to adopt the position of 
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the appellant no severed trial of any eodefendants would 
be free from the defense tactic of each defendant blam-
ing his codef endant, and then refusing to testify in the 
codefendant's separate trial, assured that the prior in-
consistent testimony would never be allowed to be in-
troduced in either of the trials. By denying the prosecu-
tion the opportunity to call as a witness a codef endant 
whose testimony has implicated the defendant on trial 
and to impeach his refusal to testify by prior inconsistent 
tesitimony, the court would be burdening the prosecution 
with requirements beyond their control simply on the 
basis that the eodefendants had been granted a severed 
trial. Clearly, such a blanket opportunity for collusion 
with no similar opportunity afforded the prosecution to 
present prior inconsistent testimony is not warranted. 
B. The decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court make it dear that the purpose of the confronta-
tion clause is to advance a practical concern for the ac-
curacy of the trath-determining process in criminal trials 
by assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis 
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. Button 
v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 91 S. Ot. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 
(1970). The common law has always recognized excep-
tions to the confrontation dause where the defendant 
was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness 
and the witness was subsequently unavailable to testify. 
Existence of these exceptions to the confrontation clause 
indicates that the confrontation clause does not confer 
an absolute right to cross-examine. 
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Indeed, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 
1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 933 (1965), the landmark decision 
which held that the right of cross-examination was in-
cluded in the right of an accused in a criminal case to 
confront the witnesses against him, referred to many 
decisions that have approved the admission of hearsay 
evidence. Professor McCormick, in explaining that the 
emphasis of the confrontation clause is concerned with 
personal presence of the witness at the trial and afford-
ing defense counsel an opportunity for cross-examination, 
also agrees that the confrontation clause is not absolute 
and that in some instances both requirements may be 
dispensed with. McCormick, Evidence 606 (1972). 
Most of the decisions involving a defendant's right 
to confront the witnesses against him concern prior tes-
timony by the appellant offered in a preliminary hearing 
or prior statements by the appellant made out of the 
courtroom. Thus, the present case is rather unique in 
that the prior testimony was offered by the appellant's 
codefendant in a previous severed trial. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence allow the introduction 
of prior testimony under Rule 63 (3), as an exception to 
the hearsay rule, if: 
". . . the judge finds that the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness . . . in another action 
. . ., when . . . the issue is such that the adverse 
party on the former occasion has the right and 
opportunity for cross-examination with an inter-
est and motive similar to that which the adverse 
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party has in the action in which the testimony 
is offered." 
Concerning the requirement of unavailability, the United 
States Supreme Court held long ago that admitting the 
prior testimony of an unavailable witness did not violate 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Mat-
tox v. United States, 156 U. S, 237, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39 
L. Ed. 409 (1895). In addition, the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence recognize that a witness is unavailable when he 
is exempted from testifying on the ground of privilege. 
Rule 62 (7) (a), U. R. E. (1971). Because of the practical 
necessities, the great weight of authority still holds that 
the exercise of a privilege not to testify renders a witness 
unavailable. Mason v. United States, 407 F. 2d 903 (10th 
Cir. 1969); United States v. Mobley, 421 F. 2d 345 (5th 
Cir. 1970); United States v. Elmore, 423 F. 2d 775 (4th 
Cir. 1970). 
The requirement that the adverse party had an 
opportunity for cross-examination during the previous 
testimony, with an interest and motive similar to the 
present action was satisfied by the prosecution's cross-
examination of the codefendant. 
This is clear from observing the two effects of the 
codefendant's prior testimony. First, the appellant was 
implicated as a perpetrator of the robbery. The effect 
of this testimony presented nothing to the jury which 
had not already been testified to by the two victims of 
the crime, and was already an issue before the jury. 
Second^ by implicating the appellant as the sole perpe-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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> 
trator of the robbery, the codefendant was exculpating 
his own participation in the crime. This testimony was 
adequately cross-examined by the prosecution in the 
previous trial since the conviction of the codefendant 
depended entirely upon a showing by the prosecution 
that appellant was not the sole perpetrator of the crime. 
Thus, the prosecution was of necessity forced into chal-
lenging the codefendant's testimony in the same way as 
appellant would have done had he been the party to do 
so. 
For example, during the cross-examination the pros-
ecution: 
(a) challenged the codefendant's statement of ap-
pellant's reasons for returning to the bar until the code-
fendant admitted that the reasons did not make any 
sense to him (Tr. 226) ; 
(b) challenged the codefendant's statement that 
appellanit was the sole perpetrator of the robbery until 
the codefendant finally admitted that he did not know 
that appellant took the wallets and money of the victims 
(Tr. 231); 
(c) challenged the codefendant's assessment of the 
time in which appellant accomplished the entire robbery 
until the court had to stop the prosecution for improper 
questioning (Tr. 232-233); 
(d) challenged the codefendant's statement that 
the appellant was using a weapon until several objections 
were raised by defense counsel (Tr. 233-234); 
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(e) challenged the codefendant's reason for not 
mentioning the truth to the police at the time he was 
apprehended until defense counsel objected (Tr. 239); 
(f) challenged the defendant's perception and re-
liability concerning his not seeing the money bag which 
was used during the robbery (Tr. 235). 
Therefore, the role of the appellant in the robbery, 
according to the codefendant's prior testimony, could be 
weighed by the jury in light of the prosecution's cross-
examination, the codefendant's prior conviction, Ms re-
liability, and his motive in offering such testimony. 
Respondent also contends that the reliability of the 
prior testimony satisfied appellant's Sixth Amendment 
rights. In Button v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 
27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970), where an inmate related at trial 
a statement of respondent's codefendant who did not 
testify at the defendant's trial, the court held there was 
no violation of Sixth Amendment rights where the testi-
mony was sufficiently clothed with certain "indicia of 
reliability." These indicia of reliability have been widely 
viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be 
placed before the jury though there is no confrontation 
of the declarant. 
In California v. Green, 399 U. S. 156, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 
26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970), where a minor's statement at 
respondent's preliminary hearing was admitted to prove 
that respondent had furnished marijuana to the minor 
in violation of Cahfornia law and where a claimed lapse 
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of memory by the minor affected respondent's right to 
cross-examination, the Court held that even in the ab-
sence of an opportunity for full cross-examination at 
trial, the admission into evidence of the preliminary 
hearing testimony did not violate the Constitution. The 
Court in Green echoed the "indicia of reliability" test 
and compared the purposes of the confrontation clause 
with the dangers of admitting an out-of-court statement. 
The majority stated that the purpose of confrontation 
was to insure that the witness is under oath; that he is 
subject to crossnexaminaition; and that his demeanor is 
observed by the trier of fact. Id. at 158. The dangers 
most courts fear in admitting out-of-court statements are 
substantially lessened in the present case because the 
testimony was made during a prior trial where the wit-
ness was testifying under oath and his testimony was 
subject to cross-examination. 
The "indicia of reliability" test, that affords the trier 
of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statement, was also applied in Mancussi v. Stubbs, 
408 U. S. 204, 92 S. Ct. 2308, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1972). 
The case involved prior testimony by a state's witness 
who had premanently removed himself to a foreign coun-
try and could not be compelled to return to the second 
trial by the state and held that the witness was con-
sidered unavailable at the second trial and therefore 
there was no constitutional error in permitting his prior 
recorded testimony to be read to the jury at the trial. 
In the present case, the prior statement was read into 
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the record when appellant's codefendant refused to testi-
fy on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment. Under the 
"indicia of reliability" standard in Mancussi, the prior 
testimony of appellant's codefendant was admissible on 
the grounds that the witness was unavailable at trial and 
his prior testimony was reliable since it was presented 
in the first trial. 
In United States v. Allen, 409 F. 2d 611 (10th Cir. 
1969), the court discussed the factors of unavailability, 
prior tetsimony, and demeanor which have been con-
sidered in connection with confrontation issues.. The 
case involved testimony or several witnesses at the pre-
liminary hearing which was later read into the record 
after defendant invoked his privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment, and held that the prior testimony was ad-
missible and did not violate appellant's right to confron-
tation. In the opinion the court considered three argu-
ments which it felt were untenable. First, the court 
found that the requirement of unavailability was saifcis-
fied not when the witness was physically present but 
when his testimony was unavailable because of invocation 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Second, the court 
found that the preliminary hearing testimony and actual 
trial testimony were substantially similar. Third, on the 
basis of Mattox, supra, the court held that evidence of 
the witness's demeanor while testifying at the prelimin-
ary hearing was not an essential ingredient of the con-
frontation privilege. Following these considerations, the 
testimony of the codefendant in the present case was 
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admissible because the codefendant was unavailable, the 
trial testimony was taken under substantial safeguards 
and the fact that the witness's demeanor was not pre-
sented fofr the jury was not controlling. 
Appellant also contends that knowledge by the pros-
ecution that appellant would invoke his privilege against 
self -incrimination was a controlling factor. Respondent 
has pareviously shown that the refusal of the codefendant 
to testify was not anticipated by the prosecution (Tr. 
187, 188). Nevertheless, "the mere calling of a witness 
to the stand to make him invoke the privilege against 
self ^ crimination does not constitute a denial of the right 
to confrontation." United States v. Gemie, 252 F. 2d 664 
(2d Cir. 1958), cert, den., 356 U. S. 968, 78 S. Ot. 1006, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1073, rehearing denied, 357 U. S. 944, 78 S. 
Ot. 1383, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1558. In Gemie, a witness who 
was implicated in the same crime for which the defen-
dant was being tried and who had plead guilty prior 
to trial was called to the stand and invoked the privilege. 
The Second Circuit was of the opinion that it made no 
difference whether the government had reason to believe 
that the witness would refuse to testify. The government 
had a right "to produce the witness and thus show the 
jury that it was bringing forward such witness as may 
have knowledge bearing on the case." 252 F. 2d at 669. 
Appellant bases his contention that his constitu-
tional right to confrontation was violated primarily upon 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 
13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1,965), which held that it was 
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error to admit an out-of-court statement by a co-
defendant, when the codefendant refused to testify 
and the statement was brought before the jury by the 
prosecution's leading questions. Respondent contends 
that Douglas is distinguishable from the present case 
and that the more appropriate rule is the rule under 
Mancussi and Green, supra. The most obvious distrac-
tion is that in Douglas the confession was made to police 
officers out of court, whereas the codefendant's state-
ment in the present case was made during a previous 
trial, under oath, and subject to cross-examination. Not 
only was the prior testimony in the present case subject 
to cross-examination, but it was subject to cross-exam-
ination at the time the statement was made, a relevant 
factor considered in Green, supra. Second, Douglas was 
decided on the basis of no adequate opportunity for cross-
examination whereas the quality of the cross-examination 
of the codefendant is the only issue in the present case. 
Third, in Douglas, the confession "formed a crucial link 
in the proof both of Douglas' act and of the requisite 
intent to murder." 380 U. S. at 419. In the present case 
there was sufficient evidence without the admission of 
the codefendant's testimony to show that a robbery had 
been committed and that appellant committed the crime. 
Fourth, the flagrant impropriety by the prosecution in 
Douglas, is absent in the present case, for in Douglas, 
after the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment, the 
prosecution persisted in reading the confession bit by bit 
pausing to ask the witness after each part, "Did you 
make that statement?" In the present case the court 
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permitted the prosecution to ask four leading questions 
to which the co-defendant invoked his privilege against 
self4ncrimination. None of the questions referred to the 
substantive material of the transcript (Tr. 186). 
C. If the court finds that the admission into evi-
dence of the prior testimony of the codef endant presented 
a constitutional issue, then the question remains whether 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427, 92 S. Ct. 1056, 31 L. 
Ed. 2d 340 (1972), where three defendants tried jointly 
were convicted of murder following a trial in which police 
officers testified concerning a detailed confession by 
petitioner's codef endant, who did not testify, and which 
undermined petitioner's original version of the crime, the 
Court held that any violation of petitioner's constitu-
tional rights that might have occurred was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt in view of the overwhelming 
evidence of petitioner's guilt as manifested by his con-
fession, which completely comported with the objective 
evidence, and the compartively insignificant effect of the 
codefendant's admission. The Utah Supreme Courts in 
State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P. 2d 929 (1973), 
where the defendant was convicted of murder following 
a trial in which the testimony of two witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing, Who were outside of the State at 
the time of trial, was read to the jury, the Court held 
that although the State had made an insufficient effort 
to obtain the presence of the witnesses and the defen-
dant was thereby denied his right to confrontation of the 
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witnesses against him, the error was not such that it was 
reasonably probable that there would have been a result 
more favorable to the defendant in the absence of the 
error. The Court reasoned that the error was to be evalu-
ated in conformity with Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), 
which required the Court to render judgment without 
regard to errors or defects which did not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. In the present case if the 
admission of the prior testimony was a denial of appel-
lant's constitutional right to confrontation, then it was 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would not 
have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. At 
the trial the evidence presented by the prosecution 
showed that: (a) appellant and Mr. Travis entered the 
lounge together and pushed Mr. Zancanella and Mr. 
Roberts down on the floor (Tr. 32, 33, 80); (b) appellant 
and Mr. Travis forcibly took the victims' wallets, money, 
and other personal belongings, and then took money be-
longing to the business located in a money bag and cash 
register behind the bar counter (Tr. 33-36, 55-58); (c) 
Mr. Roberts was beaten and lost consciousness when he 
was hit over the head (Tr. 36, 55-56); (d) two persons 
left the lounge together carrying a money bag (Tr. 81); 
(e) Mr. Zancanella told the police he had been robbed 
(Tr. 84, 112); (f) appellant, Mr. Travis, and Miss Ruwe 
were later apprehended with various rolls of coins, sacks, 
and personal items belonging to Mr. Zancanella, Mr. 
Roberts, and the lounge (Tr. 108, 109); (g) at the place 
of apprehension, Mr. Zancanella identified appellant and 
Mr. Travis as the men who had robbed him (Tr. 126). 
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In addition, a witness who observed the events surround-
ing the crime testified that he saw two persons enter the 
lounge, return with what appeared to be a money bag 
and leave in a vehicle of the same description as was 
later apprehended by officers and which contained the 
appellant and his codefendant (Tr. 79-83). Furthermore, 
the evidence showed that the appellant was apprehended 
within minutes after the robbery had taken place while 
he was in the process of leaving the State of Utah (Tr. 
158, 159). This evidence was clearly sufficient, without 
the testimony of appellant's codefendant, for the jury 
to find that a robbery had been committed and appellant 
was one of the persons who committed the crime. There-
fore, if it appears that the introduction of the prior testi-
mony raised a constitutional objection to the procedure 
of the trial court, the error was not of sufficient weight 
to preclude the jury from rendering a verdict that ap-
pellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition to his constitutional objection to the 
procedure of the trial court, the appellant claims that 
the admission into evidence of a metal club was error 
since the charge of aggravated robbery had been dropped 
by the prosecution. Respondent contends that the ad-
mission of the weapon was not error since Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, under which ap-
pellant was charged, required that the taking of the vic-
tims' property be "against his will, accomplished by 
means of force or fear." Clearly, the possession of a 
metal club by appellant was evidence to be evaluated by 
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the jury in determining whether the requirements of the 
statute had been met. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the prior testimony of appellant's codefen-
dant was admitted into evidence for impeachment pur-
poses, was clothed with certain indicia of reliability in 
that it was made in court, under oath, and subject to 
adequate crtDss^xamination, and any error that could 
have been committed was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, appellant's right to confront the witnesses against 
him was not denied by the procedure of the trial court. 
In addition, evidence of a metal club possessed by the 
appellant during the robbery was admissible to prove 
one of the elements of the crome. Therefore, respondent 
respectfully submits that appellant's request for reversal 
or a new trial be denied and that the verdict and judg-
ment of the jury at the trial be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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